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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Cheryl Mwaria*
The current debate concerning physician-assisted suicide, and
what has been called its twin, active voluntary euthanasia, is di-
rected toward the public policy question of whether these should
be legalized. Proponents of legalization focus on the rather narrow
issues of autonomy and relief from suffering of the individual. Op-
ponents base their arguments on the sanctity of life, concerns about
a "slippery-slope," and the appropriate role of physicians.1 The de-
bate itself is conducted primarily by "experts" in social policy for-
mation. Together, these factors severely constrain the nature and
structure of this debate, precluding a discussion of wider social
norms and ideals and the manner in which legalization will affect
social relations.
In considering physician-assisted suicide, the real challenge lies
in understanding the nature of culture itself. By definition, culture
is learned behavior pertaining to norms for what is considered
proper, moral, or even sane; as well as values, customs, beliefs and
artifacts that comprise the knowledge and technology by which we
adapt, or fail to adapt, to the physical environment. Focusing as it
does on the individual, our current approach to death seems to pre-
sume culture is irrelevant. Nothing, however, could be further
from the truth. Missing from this debate is a discussion the social
consequences of hidden expectations and obligations with respect
to access to health care, allocation of resources, terminal and
* Associate Professor of Medical Anthropology, Hofstra University. B.A., An-
thropology, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Anthropology, Columbia University.
1. The literature concerning euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is volumi-
nous, but focuses primarily on legal and moral issues pertaining to the individual. See,
e.g., MARGARET PABST BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE (1995) [hereinafter BAT-
TIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE]; MARGARET PABST BATFIN, THE LEAST WORSE
DEATH (1994); EUTHANASIA: THE MORAL ISSUES (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Ro-
senbaum eds., 1989); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1994); CHOOSING
DEATH: ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE (Ron Hamel
ed., 1991); HANS KUNG & WALTER JENS, DYING WITH DIGNITY: A PLEA FOR PER-
SONAL RESPONSIBILITY (John Bowden trans., 1995); EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF
THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY (Robert I. Misben ed., 1992); NEW YORK
STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT (1994).
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chronic illness; disability, difference, suffering, and the nature of
death itself.
I. Hidden Dimensions of Culture
Every culture has hidden dimensions that operate at the level of
the unconscious. When constructing models of culture, therefore,
anthropologists consider varying levels of behavior: covert and
overt; implicit and explicit.2 Each of us is socialized from birth to
particular sets of behavioral expectations (roles) governing specific
statuses (positions in patterns of reciprocal relationships, for exam-
ple, "husband" vs. "wife"). So ingrained are our expectations with
respect to given statuses that we are jarred when they are violated,
having come to view them as natural rather than learned behaviors.
This is what makes it difficult for us to accept cultural differences
on the part of others or even nonconforming behavior in our own
society. It has been argued that conformity to cultural, and thereby
shared, standards of behavioral expectations is the byproduct of
the benefits of inclusion in cooperative activities, resulting in selec-
tive pressure for a sensitivity to others' opinions of one.' Changes
in one set of behavioral expectations may affect changes in many
others in a rippling effect, though these often occur without our
conscious awareness. This slow transmutation of experience comes
about through "taken-for-granted cultural processes of representa-
tion in the popular culture that infiltrate the ordinary practices of
living."4 For example, organ transplant technology has led to a re-
definition of death in the United States. As Margaret Lock co-
gently asserts:
This relatively quiet remaking of death has been masked
throughout by a focus on the heroics of medicine and the pro-
longation of life. Two impending deaths are, of course, involved
- that of the donor and that of the recipient - but the public
imagination has been fired in North America by the idea of the
2. This does not mean that the Jungian hypothesis of a pan-human collective un-
conscious is shared by all anthropologists; though more recent work on the nature of
memory raises some tantalizing areas for investigation. See RUPERT SHELDRAKE, THE
PRESENCE OF THE PAST (1988); EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE (1976).
3. See Daniel M.T. Fessler, Towards An Understanding of the Universality of Sec-
ond Order Emotions (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author). Fessler
argues as follows: "Individuals seeking inclusion must be especially sensitive to such a
shared standard. The benefits of participation in cooperative activities thus created
selective pressure for an affect-laden attention to norms. This, in turn, may have pro-
vided the foundation for the elaboration of culture."
4. Arthur Kleinman & Joan Kleinman, Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in
Our Times, 125 DAEDALUS 1, 15 (Winter 1996).
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"gift" of life. The life and death of the patient from whom or-
gans are "harvested" is left unmarked except as "donor." . . .
The media usually focuses our attention on the life that will be
"saved," and particularly on the moments during and immedi-
ately after surgery when the proclamation of success is made;
survival rates beyond the first few weeks fail to make more than
serendipitous coverage, and very few people know about the
prognosis for transplant patients, long-term outcomes, or about
their "quality of life" after surgery.5
For these reasons I use the term "hidden" when referring to so-
cial expectations and obligations. What we must address when
considering whether or not to legalize physician-assisted suicide is
the ways in which our cultural expectations are likely to change.
Anthropologists have long known that attitudes toward suicide
and assisted suicide vary cross-culturally. Likewise, research indi-
cates that suicide rates themselves vary both cross-culturally and
sub-culturally. While there is debate about the specific causes of
suicide, it is clear that cultural expectations play a considerable
role. Emile Durkheim first articulated this view in his seminal
work, Suicide.6 One form of socio-genic suicide is altruistic suicide.
In the Durkheimian view, altruistic suicide is the product of social
forces beyond the individual's control. The individual in such cases
is highly integrated into the society and the individual's life is rigor-
ously governed by the customs of the society. As Pabst Battin
notes, examples of this are plentiful and can be seen in the Japa-
nese seppuku or suicide of honor by disemboweling; India's suttee
or self-immolation by widows; and the nineteenth century military
practice wherein suicide was de rigeur for officers unable to pay
gambling debts.7 The second order emotions of shame and pride as
reactions to the opinions of an "other" may be at work here, pro-
5. Margaret Lock, Displacing Suffering: The Reconstruction of Death in North
America and Japan,125 DAEDALUS 207, 217-18 (Winter 1996). Lock provides an in-
sightful and detailed look at the way organ transplant technology changed the defini-
tion of death in North America resulting in the routinization of organ transplants
prior to public discussion of the remaking of death. Any discussion now is "colored
by the pressures that a perceived escalating 'shortage' of organs adds to the debate."
Id. at 218. This is in stark contrast to Japan where organ transplants are rare and
although the diagnosis of brain death is made it is used "not as a signal to turn off the
respirator, but to prepare relatives for impending death." Id. at 218. The public dis-
course in Japan has focused on a search for a national consensus about death which is
perceived as a process rather than as an event. See id.
6. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 361-93
(1951).
7. See BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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moting conformity to social norms.8 Japanese culture in particular
has been noted for its emphasis on making other people's opinions
the criterion of action. In The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, an-
thropologist Ruth Benedict used the term "shame culture" to de-
scribe this characteristic of Japanese culture.9 For Durkheim, such
suicides involved no moral discredit because they were the product
of relentless social forces, and thus were involuntary.10
This point deserves elaboration for it bears directly on the cur-
rent debate. What seems on the surface to be a voluntary act, the
rational decision to end one's life, may actually be the product of
social expectations. Few people in societies discussed above hark
back to "the good old days" when such social forces were at work.
Let us consider another set of cross-cultural examples pertaining to
altruistic suicide, in this case, of the aged and infirm. The examples
I would like to consider here come from two distinct types of social
organization: that of the western Shoshone, who were nomadic
hunter-gatherers like the Eskimo, and that of sedentized peasant
populations in Italy and Japan. Each of these societies had institu-
tionalized practices where the aged/infirm were left to die.
In the case of the Shoshone and the Eskimo, individuals who
could no longer keep up were abandoned by the group. The Japa-
nese and Italian villagers, on the other hand, were taken to a high
mountain where their children (usually an elder son) facilitated
their deaths by pushing them off the mountain. When these prac-
tices first came to light in the literature they were viewed with ab-
horrence as being cruel and indicative of the low value their
respective practitioners placed on the sanctity of human life. This
proved not to be the case. Later, fieldwork conducted by ethnog-
raphers revealed a picture that was more complex, though no less
disturbing. In most cases the abandonment or death was initiated
by the old/infirm person, apparently to avoid becoming a burden to
the group. This was the case even when, as Asen Balikci reports in
his study of the Netsilik Eskimo, "the sick person's relatives try to
dissuade him from committing suicide."" While a socio-genic ex-
planation of suicide clearly does not cover all suicides, it is equally
apparent that altruistic suicide seems to increase under conditions
8. See Fessler, supra note 3.
9. See RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF
JAPANESE CULTURE 223 (1946).
10. See BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE, supra note 1, at 11.
11. ASEN BALIKCI, THE NETSILIK ESKIMO, 166-67 (1970).
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of scarcity, particularly when food is scarce.- The examples
presented here occurred under near-starvation conditions.
In the Durkheimian view, it was futile to attempt to stop individ-
ual suicides because success could only be piecemeal in the face of
larger social forces. 2 Nevertheless, suicide rates for each of the
aforementioned situations have dramatically decreased following
changes in social institutions and organization, in other words, by
altering cultural expectations. This generally occurs as a result of
changing cultural contact and the introduction of a new set of
expectations.
In our own society, as philosopher Margaret Pabst Battin opined
in her book Ethical Issues in Suicide, "The Durkheimian model of
suicide as socio-genic has had less evident public impact, perhaps
because its demands - to change society - are much more diffi-
cult, and the theory itself has been confirmed only on a simplified
model not apparently applicable to all societies.' 1 3 She goes on to
point to a philosophical problem with Durkheim's theory by raising
the question, "If suicide rates can be genuinely and significantly
decreased only by large-scale changes in the institutions and orga-
nizations of society, what changes, so to speak, are worth the
gain?""4 A far more significant question in the debate over physi-
cian-assisted suicide is, "If suicide rates have been genuinely linked
to socio-cultural expectations, what is to be gained by altering
these expectations in such a way as to favor increased rates of sui-
cide?" In order to examine the ways in which our cultural expecta-
tions are likely to change with the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide and active euthanasia it is imperative that we consider some
of our current hidden social expectations, and the ways in which
the more vulnerable segments of our society may be affected by
new expectations.
II. Euthanasia from the Perspective of the Disabled
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide frame the legalization
debate in terms of the individual facing the last stages of a terminal
illness and voluntarily electing a "death with dignity," thereby
avoiding or curtailing debilitating pain and suffering. Such a
framework involves several covert assumptions. First, linking eu-
thanasia policy with "death with dignity" suggests that one should
12. See BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE, supra note 1, at 12.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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"go gentle into that good night.115 In other words, that a policy of
active voluntary euthanasia is exactly what its Greek origin implies,
"a good death." Under the guise of objectivity, however, lies a hid-
den premise that responses to debilitation and pain are uniform.
This ignores voluminous evidence in both medicine and the social
sciences to the contrary.
The appropriation of the term "death with dignity" encompasses
another hidden assumption as well: that life with profound disabil-
ity is lacking in dignity. There is a genuine and warranted fear on
the part of many people with profound disabilities that their lives
will be devalued, considered not worth living. Indeed, several
states have laws permitting the abortion of fetuses deemed de-
formed, suggesting that a child born with a handicap is "terrible. '16
As the Bloomington Baby Doe controversy revealed:
Recognizing the difficulty of openly placing the parents interests
ahead of the child's, proponents of parental or parental-medical
discretion over newborns with handicaps do not rely on the re-
productive choice cases. Instead, they attempt to support paren-
tal discretion as euthanasia, mercy killing, or the "right to die."
They do not claim that parents have a protectable right so much
as babies do. The decision the parents would make becomes a
decision "for the child" and "in the best interests of the child"
rather than for the distressed parents, for the siblings, or for a
society that will have to bear many of the child's expenses in life.
It is the child's "right to die" that is defended. 7
This is of paramount concern to many disabled people whose
grassroots civil rights movement over the past two decades has
sought to deconstruct disabling environments, empower them-
selves and change the image of disability. By structuring the de-
bate over physician-assisted suicide with individual case scenarios,
15. Dylan Thomas, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in THE POEMS OF
DYLAN THOMAS 207 (Daniel Jones ed. 1971).
16. See, e.g., 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 183; 1991 Tenn. Pub. Acts 509; 1991 Iowa Acts
103, 267. See also Martha A. Field, Killing 'the Handicapped,' 16 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 79 (1993). Field argues, "sometimes when abortions for handicap are called ther-
apeutic, it seems to be the health of the fetus-the 'defect' in the fetus-that is being
referred to, rather than the health of the mother .... how can an abortion possibly be
therapeutic to the very fetus it eliminates?" Id. at 112. It should be obvious that such
statutes discriminate against handicap, but our cultural expectations that the lives of
people with profound disabilities are so devoid of 'quality' that they are not worth
living has allowed such laws to go relatively unchallenged.
17. Field, supra note 16, at 84-85. See also Marian Blackwell-Stratton et al.,
Smashing Icons: Disabled Women and the Disability and Women's Movements, in Wo-
MEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS (Michelle
Fine & Adrienne Asch eds., 1988).
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often with the focus on the severely disabled individual electing
death, "the message to society is that being severely disabled is be-
ing without hope or promise."' 8 What is hidden in this message is
the nature and history of cultural prejudice towards the disabled in
our culture. This was documented in the 1984 amicus brief for the
U.S. Supreme Court case Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
which reads:
Disabled people throughout history have been regarded as in-
complete human beings - "defectives." In early societies this
view of disabled people resulted in persecution, neglect, and
death. These practices gradually gave way to the more humani-
tarian belief that disabled people should be given care and pro-
tection. Persecution was largely replaced by pity, but the
exclusion and segregation of disabled people remain unchal-
lenged. Over the years, the false belief that disabled people
were incompetent and dependent on charity, custodial care, and
protection became firmly imbedded in the public consciousness.
The invisibility of disabled Americans was simply taken for
granted and the innate biological and physical "inferiority" of
disabled people was considered self-evident. 9
The key concern of disabled consumers regarding euthanasia is
that "medical and legal professionals serve as the primary 'gate-
keepers,' controlling access in euthanasia. "20 Thus far, clinicians,
resource managers, lawyers, journalists and bioethicists have domi-
nated the debate concerning euthanasia policy. Disabled consum-
ers view these individuals as controlling information given to
terminally ill patients about future quality of life and prospects for
pain and suffering.2 As medical anthropologist Joseph Kaufert
noted in an article on euthanasia policy from the perspectives of
disabled consumers, "[i]n focusing upon the impact of public and
professional values determining the 'social worth' of the lives of
disabled people, disability organizations have also recognized the
18. See Joseph M. Kaufert, Euthanasia Policy: Disabled Consumers' Perspectives in
EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS: A MODEL FOR CANADA? 55, 58 (Barney
Sneiderman & Joseph M. Kaufert eds., 1994) (quoting an article in the Winnipeg Free
Press dated February 12, 1992, in which John Lane, President of the Canadian Para-
plegic Association, was concerned about the ease with which the public accepted as
worthless the life of Nancy B., a paraplegic who requested euthanasia).
19. Amicus Brief, Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984)
(quoted in Kaufert, supra note 18). This brief was submitted in support of the argu-
ment that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act covers employment.
20. Kaufert, supra note 18, at 55.
21. See id.
19971
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hazards of such devaluations in the formation of public policy."22
Such concerns are legitimate when we recall that suicide often
means the removal of social burdens, including psychological, emo-
tional, and/or financial burdens imposed by the chronically or ter-
minally ill. Margaret Pabst Battin put it succinctly by stating:
The social-burdens argument is particularly problematic in the
circumstances associated with physician-assisted suicide - ter-
minal illness, and perhaps even severe chronic illness, severe dis-
ability, and extreme old age - since the costs of medical
treatment, hospitalization, palliation, rehabilitative treatment,
domestic assistance and other terminal and chronic care can be
enormous."23
There has been a general silence in the debate with respect to
this assumption, although it is held by both proponents and oppo-
nents of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. Those who
most often give voice to concerns that the debate will be based on
the narrow perception of economic efficiency are opponents of the
policy who fear that it will inevitably lead. to a chilling conclusion.
Though often dismissed by philosophers as a "slippery-slope" argu-
ment, the fears of vulnerable populations, particularly the disabled
and the poor who comprise a significant and growing portion of
our society, are well founded when we consider another hidden as-
sumption within this debate, that is, that the legalization of physi-
cian-assisted suicide and euthanasia would actually be cost-
effective. This is reminiscent of the rationale underlying not only
the practices of the previously mentioned hunter-gatherer and vil-
lage populations, which faced starvation, but also of the T4 eutha-
nasia policy of Nazi Germany, which did not.
While those favoring legalization argue that safeguards against
abuses on the scale of the Nazis could be put in place, there is a
flawed logic here. Few safeguards can be placed on cultural expec-
tations.24 As anthropologists Arthur and Joan Kleinman have
stated:
22. Id. at 65.
23. BATrIN, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE, supra note 1, at 210.
24. Proponents of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide and voluntary ac-
tive euthanasia often view the mention of the Nazi T4 program as another "slippery
slope" argument which, as all such arguments, fails to identify a causal force. It is also
rejected as a fair comparison to voluntary euthanasia in that it was clearly murder.
These dismissals miss the point raised by disabled consumers who argue that the Nazi
T4 program began touted as a 'merciful' policy for the physically and mentally dis-
abled who were considered to be 'grievously suffering' and who requested euthanasia
on 'therapeutic' grounds. See GITTA SERENY, INTO THAT DARKNESS: FROM MERCY
KILLING TO MASS MURDER 49-50 (1974).
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The American cultural rhetoric, -for example, is changing from
the language of caring to the language of efficiency and cost; it is
not surprising to hear patients themselves use this rhetoric to
describe their problems. Thereby, the illness experience, for
some, may be transformed from a consequential moral experi-
ence into a merely technical inexpediency.
Legalization of physician-assisted euthanasia would accelerate this
process. We cannot formulate health and social policy in the con-
text of limited resources without resorting to prioritization. As-
signing priorities requires valid economic indices of illness and its
social consequences, but these alone are not enough. We need eth-
nographic input from the full spectrum of our society, particularly
those most likely to be immediately affected by policy changes. At
a 1989 Disability Ethics Conference it was argued that:
In the United States, health and social welfare policy have dis-
enfranchised many disabled consumers from basic medical and
social benefits. It has thus been questioned whether procedural
safeguards could insure that euthanasia would truly be main-
tained as the measure of last resort. In short, if the resources
are not there to ensure that the patient has been able to explore
all options short of death, how can we say that euthanasia is in
fact the measure of last resort?26
Seeking to address these concerns, disabled consumers focus on
the following ethical and communication issues:
1. Providing severely disabled and terminally ill people with op-
tions, including community-based, self-directed care.
2. Ensuring that consumers' decisions to discontinue life-pro-
longing treatment or request euthanasia are durable.
3. Ensuring that consumers' decisions are made autonomously
and reflect meaningful informed consent.
4. Providing continuity of care and access to universal health
care, palliation and social service benefits.
5. Providing access to peer counseling by other disabled and/or
terminally ill persons.
6. Developing quality of life criteria which reflect consumer
preferences and avoid application of external standards of social
worth to the lives of the disabled or terminally ill.27
25. Arthur Kleinman & Joan Kleinman, The Appeal of Experience; The Dismay of
Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS &
SCIENCES, Winter 1996, at 14-15.
26. Kaufert, supra note 18, at 65.
27. Id. at 57.
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Social scientists acknowledge that while industrial societies have
moved towards Herbert Spencer's ideal of individuation, bringing
amenities of life within the reach of millions, many people, indeed
arguably most, are prevented from enjoying such amenities by eco-
nomic deprivation, prejudice, and the unequal and inadequate ac-
cess to information inherent in the socio-economic system.
Autonomy too, exacts its own price. The increased shouldering of
personal responsibilities in isolation and often in competition with
others generates insecurity in the context of rapidly changing social
norms.28 Particularly in our culture, where independence and self-
reliance are valued while dependence is stigmatized as undignified
and shameful, old age, disability, dependence, and deprivation
pose serious challenges to the formation of social policy. The irony
in the debate over the legalization of physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia is that in the name of autonomy legalization turns over
control over the end of life to the state. The words of Yolan Kos-
ter-Dreese, vice president of The Netherlands Council of the Dis-
abled, eloquently summarize the very real fears and constraints
facing the disabled in the context of widely held public values de-
fining "social worth." She argued:
Biomedical ethicists are creating only the illusion of freedom of
choice, when discussing the clients' right to discontinue treat-
ment (or choose active euthanasia). We need the emergence of
an ethical debate which will properly engage the question of the
extent to which such choices are constrained, if the resources
necessary to sustain a high quality of independent life are not
available.29
I would add that the debate must include reflections on the ways
that euthanasia policy is likely to initiate long-term changes in so-
cial relations in our society.
28. MERVYN SUSSER ET AL., SOCIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 553 (3d ed. 1985).
29. Kaufert, supra note 18, at 66 (quoting Yolan Koster-Dreese, Oral Presentation
at the World Rehabilitation Fund Symposium (Denver, June 23, 1989).
